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Michael Herz*

INTRODUCTION

Nsingle question dominates the much discussed recent growth of
riminal enforcement of environmental laws: Is criminal envi1
ronmental law a species of environmental law or a species of criminal law? These are distinct and generally self-contained bodies of
law - each has its own set of statutes, its own division in the
Justice Department, and its own course in law school. Although
most areas of law, from bankruptcy through corporations to tax,
have "integrated" environmental law with reasonable success, the
criminal law has not.1
One might also observe that the criminal law has integrated other
regulatory schemes more successfully than it has environmental
law. Criminal enforcement of antitrust, securities, or tax laws generates far less controversy and dismay than does criminal enforcement of environmental laws.
As an historical matter, environmental criminal enforcement has
developed more as a type of environmental law rather than as a
type of criminal law. In general, prosecutors have not turned to
environmental violations as additional crimes; rather, environmental
enforcers have turned to criminal prosecutions for additional enforcement. Likewise, the criminal enforcement regime was added to
supplement an existing civil enforcement regime, and criminal

* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. Thanks to Richard Lazarus for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Parts of
this paper draw on a larger project concerning DOJ control of government litigation on which I am working with Neal Devins of the William and Mary Law
School.
1. Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution
of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEo. L.J.

2407, 2417-19 (1995).
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enforcement is seen as a harsher substitute for civil enforcement.2
Viewing the problem from the perspective of environmental enforcement, criminal sanctions are just one more, unfortunately
underutilized, arrow in the enforcement quiver. But for many this
attitude - and the failure to see criminal enforcement as essentially
different from other enforcement tools - leads to inappropriate
prosecutions.
This Article discusses structural protections against prosecutorial
overreaching. It particularly focuses on the allocation of lawyering
tasks, namely investigative and prosecutorial responsibility, among
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), Main Justice, and
the U.S. Attorneys Offices ("USAOs"). The division of labor between Main Justice and the USAO has been a source of enormous
debate, notably through oversight investigations and hearings held
by Representative John Dingell? This Article examines this division, but concentrates on the role of EPA lawyers in criminal prosecutions. In particular, it asks whether EPA should handle criminal
prosecutions, without the involvement of the Department of Justice
("DOJ"). This Article concludes that it should not, because shared
control is an important structural protection against prosecutorial
overreaching which is accompanied by few costs.

2. See generally Daniel Riesel & Arthur Jacobson, The Criminalization of
EnvironmentalLaw, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Summer 1992, at 28.
3. For contrasting views of the performance of DOJ's Environmental Crimes
Section ("ECS") and the appropriate amount of centralization of environmental
prosecutions, compare STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, DAMAGING DIsAR-

RAY: ORGANIZATIONAL BREAKDOWN AND REFORM IN THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT'S ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES PROGRAM, 103D CONG., 2D SESS.,

(1994) [hereinafter DAMAGING DISARRAY] with William T. Hassler, Congressional Oversight of FederalEnvironmental Prosecutions: The Trashing of Environmental Crimes, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,074 (Feb. 1994). The threeyear controversy over the ECS and centralization of environmental prosecutions
was brought to a close by: (1) the April 1994 resignation of ECS chief Neil
Cartusciello, (2) an August 23, 1994 amendment to the U.S. Attorney's Manual
devolving prosecutorial decision-making back to the USAOs, and (3) the November 1994 elections. The struggle is ably detailed in Theodora Galacatos, Note,
The United States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Section: A Case
Study of Inter- and IntrabranchConflict Over Congressional Oversight and the
Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 587 (1995).
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I. MINIMIZING THREATS OF PROSECUTORIAL OVERREACHING

Federal environmental statutes provide for criminal sanctions.'
Persons who "knowingly" violate certain provisions can be fined,
imprisoned, or both.' As the following table indicates, the last decade and a half has seen a striking increase in the number of criminal prosecutions. 6
EPA
EPA
EPA
Indict- Convic- Sent
Agents Cases Init. Referrals ments tions -ences* Fines**
1982
20
14
11
0
1985
40
37
5.4
.57
1988
59
50
15.4
1990 51
112
56
100
75.3
5.5
1991 62
150
81
104
80.3
14.1
1992 72
203
107
150
94.6
37.9
1993 110
410
140
161
74.3
29.7
1994 123
525
220
250
99.0
36.8
* Years of incarceration
** Millions of dollars
This rise in prosecution has been accompanied by growing concern
over prosecutorial overreaching.

4. The focus in this Article is exclusively on federal environmental enforcement. The general themes and concerns are identical at the state level, but many
of the specifics vary.
5. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
§ 3008(d) (1994) ("RCRA"); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c), Clean Water Act § 309(c)
(1994) ("CWA"); 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b), Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act § 103(b) (1994) ("CERCLA"); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(c), Clean Air Act § 113(c) (1994) ("CAA"). The provisions for civil liability do not require any particular state of mind. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b),
CAA § 113(b) (1994).
6. Hard, consistent numbers are hard to come by, and the figures here are
somewhat inconsistent with what can be found in other sources. This table is
drawn from the following sources: David B. Spence, ParadoxLost: Logic, Morality, and the Foundations of Environmental Law in the 21st Century, 20
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 145, 146 n.6 (1995); U.S. DOJ NEWS RELEASE, Depart-

ment of Justice Gets Tough on Environmental Criminals, at 4 (Dec. 27, 1989);
U.S. EPA, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS RE-

PORT, FY 1994, at 4-3, Figure 4-2 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 EPA ENFORCEMENT
REPORT].
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A. Risks of ProsecutorialExcess
The marriage of criminal and environmental law presents three
problems. First, it is a common and reasonably well-founded complaint that whether a case is brought as a civil ,,:riminal action
depends largely on happenstance and which investigator happens to
get the file in the first place.7 Indeed, one former prosecutor has
likened environmental prosecutions to criminal adultery prosecutions. They "have at least three things in common. Enforcement is
selective and erratic and the consequences are often harsh."' The
two other problems must be stated in the alternative: (1) there are
too many criminal prosecutions,9 and (2) there are too few. l

7. See, e.g., I LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 8.01[9], at 8-117
(Sheldon M. Novick et al. eds., 1995); Kevin Gaynor & Thomas R. Bartman,
Frontier Justice, ENVTL. F., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 23, 24 ("whether a violation is
treated criminally, civilly, or administratively is more a function of what type of
investigator first learns of the infraction and in which judicial district it occurs,
rather than its environmental severity"); Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times at
Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental Criminal Prosecutions and the
Work that Remains, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 900, 913 (1991) (noting that "the
way a case is handled depends on whose desk the case first arrives").
8. Daniel Riesel, Criminal Prosecution and Defense of Environmental
Wrongs, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,065, 10,065 (Mar. 1985).
9. In the words of one former Environment Division official:
Our system for punishing criminal environmental offenses is supposed
to send a deterrent message: If you do something seriously wrong, the
government will impose appropriately severe penalties ....[However,] the deterrent message has been garbled. In a few cases, defiantly
bad actors have skated free or had their wrists slapped; in too many
others, prosecutors have gone scorched-earth over comparatively trivial and unintended misconduct ....Obviously, almost everyone tries
to avoid violations of the environmental laws - at least the businesses I've worked with. But just as obviously, violations of one sort or
another occur from time to time at most major facilities. When laws
are complex and subject to varying interpretation, well-intentioned
people can make mistakes.
Donald A. Carr, Prosecutors Out of Control, ECO, June 1993, at 56. See Michael B. Gerrard, Who Goes to Jail? Understanding Criminal Liability for
Wastewater Violations, CLEARWATERS, Winter 1996, at 8.
10. See, e.g., DAMAGING DISARRAY, supra note 3; Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Copley, Hill to Examine Environmental Prosecutions, NAT'L L.J. June 28,
1993, at 5.
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Without choosing between these two (but noting in passing that if
these are the objections, the program may be doing exactly what it
should be), this Article focuses on the first concern. The underlying
issues here have been well-expressed by many writers, most recently and thoroughly by Richard Lazarus from the academic's perspective"1 and Judson Starr from the practitioner's.12 We assume, for
good reason, that criminal prosecutions have firm moral and legal
underpinnings. Conduct meriting criminal prosecution is plainly
illegal, morally wrong, seriously harmful, and pursued with a culpable state of mind. Yet environmental law is notoriously and increasingly complex, ambiguous, and aspirational, and it prohibits a great
deal of conduct that only poses a risk of harm or causes no harm in
itself but becomes harmful only if combined with a myriad of other
similar actions. Therefore, environmental criminal prosecutions pose
a particular risk of inconsistency with the normative foundations of
the criminal law. 3
The danger of inappropriate criminal prosecution that arises from
the nature of the environmental regulatory regime is exacerbated by

11. See Lazarus, supra note 1; Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental
Protectioninto Legal Rules and the Problem with Environmental Crime, 27 Loy.

L.A. L. REv. 867 (1994). For an especially strong statement of the inappropriateness of criminal environmental prosecutions across the board, see Spence, supra
note 6, at 172-81 (arguing that criminal sanctions for environmental violations are
not only completely unnecessary but also badly counterproductive).
12. See, e.g., Judson Starr et al., Prosecuting Pollution, LEGAL TIMES, May
31, 1993, at 6; Starr, supra note 7; Judson W. Starr & Thomas J. Kelly, Jr.,

Environmental Crimes and the Sentencing Guidelines: The Time Has Come...
and It Is Hard Time, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,096, 10,104 (Mar.
1990) ("one does not have to be bad to do bad when it comes to environmental
crimes") (emphasis in original).
13. These sorts of concerns are hardly limited to environmental law. Similar
hesitations have clouded criminal prosecution in other nontraditional areas. More
than three decades ago Sanford Kadish sounded most of these themes in an article about the difficulties with criminal enforcement of economic regulations such
as the antitrust laws. See generally Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observationson the
Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L.

REv. 423 (1963). Kadish pointed out the problems with criminal enforcement
when the underlying substantive prohibitions are extremely vague, defendants
generally take the corporate form and so the traditional sanctions lack their usual
efficacy, and the proscribed behavior is not generally seen as morally reprehensible. Id. at 427-40.

684 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
the fact that what drives criminal enforcement in the environmental
arena is its powerful deterrent effect. In practice, the criminal enforcement regime in environmental law does not exist to identify
and prosecute the 200 or so worst offenders each year-those who
cannot be made to comply except via the harshest sanction. It is not
about ensuring compliance directly. Rather, it achieves compliance
indirectly via the fear of penal sanction in those who might be
prosecuted. As the attention lavished on the still quite unusual criminal cases demonstrates, corporate managers who perceive civil
penalties as a cost of doing business suddenly sit up and take notice
when there is a chance they themselves might go to prison.' As is
often pointed out, prison sentences are the one sanction that cannot
be passed on to consumers or shareholders. 5
14. On the government's deterrent goals, see F. Henry Habicht II, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement: How to Remain on the
Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,478, 10,480 (Dec. 1987); EPA's
Criminal Enforcement Program:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigationsof the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 173
(1993) (statement of Webster L. Hubbell, Assoc. Att'y Gen.) ("Nothing works
better at getting managers to pay attention to environmental compliance than the
prospect of going to prison .

. . .")

[hereinafter 1993 Dingell Hearing].

15. Robert I. McMurry & Stephen D. Ramsey, Environmental Crime: The
Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 1133, 1158-59 (1986); James M. Strock, Environmental Criminal Enforcement Prioritiesfor the 1990s, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 916, 922 (1991).
A second justification for criminal environmental prosecutions is also sometimes found in their educational or denunciatory value. See generally Susan
Hedman, Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental Law, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 889 (1991). The choice of the criminal sanction registers
social disapproval and teaches that environmental violations are serious indeed.
This rationale can be, though it is not necessarily, simply a type of deterrence
argument. That is, the reason we want to denounce and teach in this way is that
potential violators, having heard the denunciation and learned the lesson, will
comply. "If [the denouncer] believes that the point of declaring society's nontoleration of this or that sort of law-breaking is to strengthen people's disapproval
of it, and so reduce its frequency, he is simply a reducer [i.e., a believer in deterrence] who believes in a particular technique." NIGEL WALKER, PUNISHMENT,
DANGER, AND STIGMA: THE MORALITY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 22 (1980), quoted
in JOHN KAPLAN & ROBERT WEISBERG, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

43 (2d ed. 1991).
In any event, the denunciatory justification, whether it rests on an instrumental or a moral theory of punishment, is less likely to promote overprosecution
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A preoccupation with the deterrent effect of harsh punishment is
dangerous, because for a deterrence regime to function it is unnecessary, indeed it would be foolish, to prosecute all those who have
committed equally serious violations. By definition, such evenhandedness is wasteful and duplicative. In addition, a deterrence
rationale for punishment supports extraordinarily severe penalties.
Thus, a single-minded concern with deterrence threatens to make
prosecutors lose sight of critical constraints. To use an example my
law school criminal law professor offered: If we really wanted to
eliminate illegal parking, and deterrence was the only consideration,
we need only cut off the hands of one illegal parker. 16 We do not
do so, of course, because deterrence is not the only consideration.
Concern for proportionality, equal treatment, and culpability, along
with a moral hesitation over such raw instrumentalism, limit the
range of possible punishments. 7 An exclusive focus on deterrence,
unmodified by these other concerns, clearly risks excessive
criminalization.
I am not convinced that the list of prosecutorial abuses is all that
long. Many writers seem concerned more with the threat than the
reality, and the number of actual prosecutions that are deemed to
have been excessive is minuscule. For example, Richard Lazarus's
case studies all involve decisions not to prosecute that on their
surface appear to be spineless concessions to lawbreakers but turn

than is the justification based on the deterrent effect of severe punishment. Harsh
penalties will educate up to a point, but if overdone they will simply backfire.
The authorities can only get so far ahead of societal consensus. Were this the
sole justification for criminal environmental prosecutions, there would be a good
deal less to fear with regard to prosecutorial excess.
16. The professor was Norval Morris. Cutting off hands (or heads) can also
be used as an example of an incapacitation strategy run amok. James Q. Wilson
observes:

Incapacitation cannot be the sole purpose of the criminal justice system; if it were, we would put everybody who has committed one or
two offenses in prison until they were too old to commit another. And
if we thought prison too costly, we would simply cut off their hands
or their heads. Justice, humanity, and proportionality, among other
goals, must also be served by the courts.
JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 145 (rev. ed. 1983).
17. See Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1423,
1435 (1995).
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out to be instances where the prosecutors appropriately stayed their
hands." These are examples that the current system works, not
that there is something wrong. In December 1995, the Washington
Legal Foundation ("WLF") filed a petition with EPA objecting to
overzealous enforcement. 9 The petition charged that "EPA is increasingly foregoing administrative and civil remedies for environmental infractions and is arbitrarily seeking felony criminal indictments for even minor offenses."' Yet the petition identified only
four criminal indictments obtained by DOJ since 1989 that it alleged were inappropriate.2' While the WLF may not have been
trying to be comprehensive, one cannot help but think that if even
the WLF can find only four such cases, perhaps the problem is not
so great.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, just examining actual prosecutions
is probably misleading. The government may be using the threat of
criminal prosecution to extract civil settlements from potential
defendants. Even if the inappropriate prosecution is rare, the possibility of overprosecution must be taken seriously.
In addition, a few real-world developments hint that the threat is
growing. First, the resources allocated to criminal prosecution have
recently been significantly increased. EPA hired its first criminal
investigators in 1980; by 1990 one hundred people were conducting
criminal investigations, including forty-seven special agents.22 That
year the Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990 mandated a four-fold
increase in investigators.23 While EPA does not quite have the full
200 criminal investigators it was supposed to have by FY 1996,24
it had 150 investigators by Summer 1996, was about to hire 21
more; and hoped to have the full complement of 200 by October

18. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 2409-10, 2496-507 (examining three case
studies of DOJ criminal cases).
19. WLF Says EPA Rule on Warnings Needed to Address "Overzealous"
Investigators, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) (Dec. 22, 1995), available in LEXIS,
Envirn. Library, BNAED file, (1995 DEN 246 dll).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Strock, supra note 15, at 917-19.
23. Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-593, 104 Stat. 2962

(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994)).
24. 1994 EPA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 4-2.
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1996.' It is an inexorable law of bureaucracy that if large numbers of people are assigned to find something, that thing will be
found, whether it is there or not. Thus, the increase in criminal
investigators and prosecutors means that the government will bring
more criminal prosecutions. Second, if one believes, as I do, that
enhanced criminal enforcement is an effective deterrent, then compliance ought to be increasing. If compliance is increasing, the
number of appropriate criminal prosecutions should be decreasing.
Yet that is not the case. No doubt this is primarily due to the fact
that criminal prosecutions were artificially low in the past, but one
cannot but worry about the future.
Finally, government figures indicate that between 1992 and 1994
indictments in environmental cases increased from 150 to 250, but
total prison sentences rose only from 94.6 years to 99 years, while
fines fell from $37.9 million to $36.8 million.26 Thus, punishment
for each defendant has generally decreased as the number of defendants has increased. This suggests that judges and juries are less
persuaded that severe wrongdoing has taken place.27
Again, none of this shows that federal prosecutors are running
rampant. But the underlying concern is real and likely to become
more pronounced in the future. The question is how to guard
against the threat of overzealousness becoming a reality.

B. Guidelines
One answer may be guidelines." It is hard to be against guidelines and their promise of regularity, consistency, and the intelligent

25. EPA to Add 21 Criminal Investigators, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 579 (July

12, 1996).
26. See supra note 6 and accompanying table. The fines figure is somewhat
misleading in that the 1992 figure includes the assessment against Exxon for the
Valdez spill. 1994 EPA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 4-2.
27. To confirm this speculation would require, among other things, a careful
examination of the role of the sentencing guidelines during the years in question.
28. Lazarus, supra note 1, at 2521-22. "The single most important [reform
that the executive branch might undertake] is the establishment of guidelines for
deciding whether a particular case warrants civil or criminal enforcement." Id.
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exercise of discretion. However, in general, guidelines promise
more than they deliver.
First, numerous guidelines channeling prosecutorial discretion in
this area already exist." These are not meaningless; no one asserts
that criminal enforcement decisions have been totally inconsistent
and ad hoc. But to the extent they have failed to date, that failure
results less from defects in the particular guidelines that now exist
than from the nature of guidelines.
After all, what would better guidelines look like? Two types of
changes might be made. First, the guidelines could be made more
specific, pinning down with precision just what renders conduct
sufficiently culpable and harmful to justify criminal prosecution.
EPA's most recent guideline is rather specific already,30 so the
29. From EPA, these include: Memorandum from Robert Perry, General
Counsel to the Regional Counsels, "Criminal Enforcement Priorities for the Environmental Protection Agency" (Oct. 12, 1982); Memorandum from T. Adams, Jr.
to Assistant Administrators, "Environmental Criminal Conduct coming to the
Attention of Agency Officials and Employees" (Sept. 21, 1987); Memorandum
from James Strock to Deputy Regional Administrations, "Regional Enforcement
Management: Enhanced Regional Case Screening" (Oct. 10, 1990); Guidelines
for Civil and Criminal Parallel Proceedings, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
35,159 (Oct. 1987); Memorandum from Earl Devaney, Director, Office of Criminal Enforcement, to All EPA Employees Working in or in Support of the
Criminal Enforcement Program, "The Exercise of Investigative Discretion" (Jan.
12, 1994) [hereinafter Devaney Memorandum]; Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66706
(1995) (relevant portions of which discuss extent to which defendant's own investigation and candor will cause EPA to forgo criminal prosecution). From DOJ,
the guidance documents include Principlesof Federal Prosecution, in U.S. DOJ,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL 9-27.000 (commonly referred to as the "United States Attorneys' Manual" or "USAM") [hereinafter USAMI; Memorandum
from Henry Habicht to the Deputy Attorney General, "Appropriateness of Incarceration in Environmental Criminal Cases" (Sept. 5, 1986); Factors in Decisions
on Criminal Prosecutionsin the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or
Disclosure Efforts by the Violator (July 1, 1991). See generally Joseph G. Block,
The Government's Decision to Initiate an Investigation, in ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIMINAL LIABILITY: AVOIDING AND DEFENDING ENFORCEMENT .ACTIONS 21,

22-33 (Donald A. Carr ed., 1995) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY].
30. The 1994 Devaney memo identifies significant harm and culpable conduct
as the touchstones of criminal liability and then identifies factors relevant to each
of these considerations. Significant harm is a function of actual harm to human
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idea would be to produce something extraordinarily detailed. But
this approach will ultimately fail. The author of the guideline cannot think of everything. The choice between different modes of
enforcement is ultimately a judgment call depending on countless
variables and arising in very different circumstances. As such, it
lends itself more to a sort of "common law" rather than a "statutory" approach. 3 Consider, for example, the Sentencing Guidelines,
which are surely the maximum one might expect in specificity for
prosecutorial guidelines. It is a standard complaint that the Sentencing Commission overlooked many relevant factors and inappropriately limited judicial discretion."2 In trying to make sure like cases
are treated alike, the Guidelines stand in the way of allowing unlike
cases to be treated differently.

health or the environment, the seriousness of threats of such harm, failure to
report an actual discharge, and any trends or common attitudes within the regulated community that suggest the need for additional deterrence. With regard to
culpability, the relevant factors are a history of repeated violations, deliberate
misconduct, concealment of misconduct, falsification of records, tampering with
monitoring equipment, and the failure to obtain permits. For a useful sketch of
the criminal investigative process and the 1994 guidance, see Steven E. Chester,
Environmental Crime and the EPA's Exercise of Criminal Investigative Discretion, 73 MICH. BAR J. 1064 (1994).
31. The inevitable drawbacks of highly specific instructions as a substitute for
good judgment in fluid and varying situations were pointed out more than a century ago by the remarkable Francis Lieber:
Men have at length found out that little or nothing is gained by attempting to speak with absolute clearness and endless specifications,
but that human speech is the clearer, the less we endeavor to supply
by words and specifications that interpretation which common sense
must give to human words. However minutely we may define, somewhere we needs must trust at last to common sense and good faith.
Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics, or Principles of Interpretation and Construction in Law and Politics, with Remarks on Precedents and
Authorities, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 1883, 1905 (1995) (republication of 3rd ed.,
1880). See also id. at 1997-98 (noting superiority of general instructions over
detailed regulations to guide someone negotiating on one's behalf); Michael
Herz, Rediscovering Francis Lieber: An Afterword and Introduction, 16
CARDOZO L. REv. 2107, 2122 n.68 (1995).
32. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Commentary: The Death of Discretion?
Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1938
(1988).
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In short, guidelines or standards are a double-edged sword. On
the one hand, they promote efficiency and consistency. Vague
guidelines pose a relatively greater risk of inconsistent treatment
than do clear and specific ones, while no standards pose the greatest such risk. On the other hand, while guidelines can ensure that
like cases are treated alike, they can also hide relevant differences.
The discretion to tailor outcomes to individual circumstances is in
essence a discretion to treat dissimilar cases differently. This is just
as important an equality principle.33
The other route to improved guidelines would be to identify all
the relevant factors, try to give them relative weights, and leave the
prosecutor to evaluate the case in light thereof. However, experience has shown that at some point amassing ever more factors
ceases to increase certainty, predictability, and consistency. To the
contrary, a multitude of factors sends decision-making in the opposite direction, ultimately imposing no constraint at all because any
decision is justifiable. For example, the Corps of Engineers' multifactor public interest test suffers from this indeterminacy of comprehensiveness.34
In sum, if inconsistent and overzealous prosecutorial decisionmaking is a problem, guidelines are unlikely to be the solution.
C. Substantive Legal Changes
Another alternative, beyond the scope of this article, but requiring
brief mention, would be to change the underlying substantive legal
standards for criminal liability. At the extreme, Congress could
simply decriminalize violations of environmental laws. More modestly, the courts might construe environmental regulations narrowly
under the rule of lenity.3" Yet another alternative, as other pieces

33. Michael Herz, Parallel Universes: NEPA Lessons for the New Property,
93 COLUM. L. REv. 1668, 1730 (1993).
34. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (1995).
35. For a comprehensive definition of the rule of lenity, see United States v.
Koehler, 973 F.2d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1992).
By providing lenient judicial readings, aggressive criminal enforcement
might prove counterproductive from the environmentalist perspective. This point
is made by Ted Schneyer, Business Lawyering and Value Creation for Clients:
Fuzzy Models of the CorporateLawyer as EnvironmentalCompliance Counselor,
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in the present symposium book discuss, is Congressional heightening of the thresholds of criminal environmental liability.36 This
could be done in various ways; for example, imposing a stricter
mens rea requirement, mitigating sentences, or creating an environmental audit privilege.37
Although this Article does not focus on the benefits of such
changes, they would not be costless.38 Such changes would probably eliminate many worthwhile cases along with the few excessive
ones, and are not the only means of constraining prosecutors.
D. Structural Responses - An Introduction
Prosecutorial guidelines or substantive legal changes would be
direct responses to the perceived problem of excessive enthusiasm
for criminal sanctions. Indirect responses, in the form of structural
arrangements, would be equally, if not more, effective at minimizing abuse. In fact, a good many structural protections are in place.
It is always useful to ask not "why are things so bad," but, "why
aren't things a thousand times worse." With regard to criminal
environmental enforcement, the answer is primarily structural. The
system is already set up to minimize abuses.
First, the terms of this debate seem almost to equate the decision
to seek an indictment with a criminal conviction. A U.S. Attorney
cannot convict. All she can do is ask a grand jury to indict (which
it will, of course) and a jury to convict (which it may or may not).
These are constitutional limits on how abusive the prosecutor can
be. Conviction is not automatic; the prosecutor has to convince the
judge and jury that a criminal offense has indeed taken place. To be
sure, in the real world the prosecutor is usually able to do so; the
federal government's conviction rate is very high.39 However, this

74 OR. L. REv. 99, 117 (1995).
36. For a discussion concerning mens rea and environmental crimes see
Richard J. Lazarus, Mens Rea in Environmental Law: Reading Supreme Court
Tea Leaves, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 861 (1996).
37. See Linda A. Spahr, Environmental Self-Audit Privilege: The Straw That
Breaks the Back of CriminalProsecutions, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 635 (1996).
38. Lois J. Schiffer & James F. Simon, The Reality of Prosecuting Environmental Criminals:A Response to ProfessorLazarus, 83 GEo. L.J. 2531 (1995).
39. Estimates vary, and the rate changes over time, but DOJ obtains a convic-
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does not mean that the jury is a meaningless rubber stamp; it means
that the cases are not so extravagant after all.
Second, even if it is "too easy" to obtain a criminal conviction
for an environmental offense, it is still much harder to obtain a
criminal conviction than a civil penalty for the same offense - the
standard of proof is higher, the investigatory and evidentiary requirements more stringent, the resources required greater. Yet the
civil penalty can be a powerful sanction. Apart from prison time for
individuals, financial sanctions are just as great in civil as in criminal cases.' Furthermore, because the government must discount
the amount of the penalty by the probability of obtaining it, the
expected penalty from a civil proceeding will be higher in precisely
those borderline situations which may not be appropriate criminal
prosecutions, since the chances of prevailing civilly are higher than
the chances of obtaining a criminal conviction. Finally, just as EPA
prefers administrative enforcement to judicial enforcement in large
measure because it is quicker and easier,4 so EPA should prefer

tion about 80% or 90% of the time. Joseph G. Block & Nancy A. Voisin, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws: The Responsible Corporate Officer
Doctrine - Can You Go to Jailfor What You Don't Know?, 22 Envtl. L. 1347,
1348 & n.4 (1992).
40. The congruence of civil and criminal sanctions might be cause for concern
that civil sanctions are too severe, but that is a topic for another day.
41. See David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular
Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority is
Shared by the United States, the States, and their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV.
1552, 1613-14 (1995). The other reason EPA prefers administrative to judicial
enforcement is that it handles administrative cases itself, without involvement (or
interference) from DOJ. From EPA's point of view, once the case has been referred to DOJ, it is out of the agency's control regardless of whether it will be
pursued criminally or civilly. As discussed below, one way to reduce EPA criminal referrals and place greater emphasis on civil enforcement would probably be
to ensure that EPA itself played the lead role in civil actions, at which point the
natural bureaucratic urge to protect turf would discourage criminal referrals in
favor of civil cases.
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civil judicial enforcement to criminal judicial enforcement. 2 Criminal prosecutions are hardly the path of least resistance.
A third aspect of the enforcement structure further protects
against overreaching, namely, the division of authority between
EPA, the USAOs, and Main Justice. It is to the allocation of investigative and prosecutorial responsibility among these three that the
rest of this Article is devoted.
II. THE DIVISION OF LMGATING AUTHORITY

Congress has established the Department of Justice as the litigator for the United States and its administrative agencies. Agencies
may not employ outside counsel for litigation; they must refer all
matters to DOJ.43 DOJ then handles the litigation:
Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation
in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party,
or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to
officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the
Attorney General."
Except as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General
shall supervise all litigation to which the United States, an agency,

42. As then Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell told John Dingell:
Civil and administrative remedies can present a number of advantages
from the government's perspective, and we have followed criminal
investigations with civil cases in some situations. The burden of proof
is lower, and there are fewer limits on admissibility of evidence. The
penalties in civil actions can be quite substantial, with correspondingly
high deterrent effect, and there is a broad range of injunctive relief
available. Given the range of relief and penalties available, a decision
to bring civil rather than criminal charges should not be viewed as a
"weaker" enforcement approach.
1993 Dingell Hearing, supra note 14, at 186 (statement of Webster L. Hubbell,
Assoc. Attorney General).
43.
Except as otherwise authorized by law, the head of an executive department or military department may not employ an attorney or counsel for the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency,
or employee thereof is a party, or is interested, or for the securing of
evidence therefor, but shall refer the matter to the Department of Justice.
5 U.S.C. § 3106 (1994).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1994).
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or officer thereof is a party, and shall direct all United States attorneys, assistant United States attorneys, and special attorneys appointed under section 543 of this title in the discharge of their
respective duties. 5
With regard to criminal prosecution, DOJ's preeminence goes
largely unquestioned. On the civil side, however, it is a source of
continuing controversy. Congress has carved out a variety of
exceptions to DOJ control, particularly among the independent
agencies,' and periodically threatens to create more. From
DOJ's perspective, it must constantly be on guard against the
dilution of its proper role as lawyer for the government.47 As for
the agencies, all have chafed under the arrangement to a greater
or lesser extent. Thus, in the words of one former head of DOJ's
Civil Division, "[t]he warfare over litigation authority never
ends .... "'
A. DOJ's Perspective on Its Control of Litigation
DOJ has a well-rehearsed pitch for centralized litigating authority. First, it frequently asserts the absolute necessity that the government speak with one voice in the courts. 9 This idea has two

45. Id. § 519.
46. See generally Neal Devins, Toward an Understanding of Legal PolicyMaking at Independent Agencies, in GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL
LEGAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 181, 182-89 (Cornell W.
Clayton ed., 1995).
47. See, e.g., Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal
Government's Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46
FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1059 (1978); The Attorney General's Role as Chief
Litigatorfor the United States, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 47 (1982).
48. Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Government: Justice and the Civil
Division, 23 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 181, 186 (1990).
49. See, e.g., Summary by Department of Justice, reprinted in 118 CONG.
REC. 21,882, 21,883 (1972) (stressing the "need for uniformity in the litigating
positions of the United States"); Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Judicial
Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 85 F.R.D. 155, 187 (1979) [hereinafter Proceedings] (transcript of comment of Lois Schiffer, currently the head
of DOJ's Environment and Natural Resources Division) ("[Among] biggest grievances of outside regulated organizations is that the Government speaks to them in
conflicting voices .... one of the ways that those conflicting voices can be made
less conflicting is to centralize both criminal and civil enforcement authority for
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components. In part, it is about consistency and uniform positions: the federal government should not argue for broad deference to agency interpretation or reliance on legislative history one
day and against it the next. In addition, it is about avoiding conflict between parts of the executive branch in court. Without the
need to rely on DOJ for representation, individual agencies might
be facing off in court - a prospect that, depending on one's
point of view, may be embarrassing, unseemly, destructive to
sound policy, or unconstitutional. 0 Thus, the single voice principle seems an amalgam of different concerns: protecting turf, a
quasi-aesthetic distaste for governmental inconsistency, an equal
protection sort of idea about treating like cases alike, and a worry
that inconsistency will make the United States a less-effective litigant.
Closely related to the "one voice" principle is a concern about
authority. If the government speaks with two contradictory voices, at least one of those will not be the President's. If one begins
with the premise that the executive branch is unitary and must
reflect the President's views and policies, for which the President
will and should be held accountable, then the system has broken
down if parts of the branch are taking inconsistent positions.
DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel concludes that
it is essential that the Attorney General not relinquish his supervisory authority over the agency's litigation functions, for the Attorney General alone is obligated to represent the broader interests of
the Executive. It is this responsibility to ensure that the interests of

the United States as a whole, as articulated by the Executive, are
given a paramount position over potentially conflicting interests
between subordinate segments of the government of the United
States which uniquely justifies the role of the Attorney General as
the chief litigator for the United States. Only the Attorney General

has the overall perspective to perform this function."I

the same statute in one place[, i.e., DOJ] ...."); The Attorney General's Role as
Chief Litigatorfor the United States, supra note 47.

50. On intragovernmental litigation in general, see Michael Herz, United
States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?, 32 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 893 (1991).
51. The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator for the United States,
supra note 47, at 54 (emphasis in original).
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Third, for DOJ, the expertise of the litigator is litigation; DOJ
lawyers have courtroom skills and familiarity with recurrent nonagency-specific legal questions that agency lawyers lack. 2 The
agency itself will benefit from having top-notch litigators representing it. 3 DOJ does not claim the agency lawyer's detailed
familiarity with the specifics of particular statutes or programs.
To the contrary, it suggests that the generalist's more passing
familiarity can be an advantage, since the judicial audience that
must be convinced also consists of generalists. Finally, DOJ
lawyers are superior at choosing cases as vehicles to advance
certain policies because they are more familiar with trends within
the judiciary and the tendencies of particular judges. 4
Finally, in what may be seen as a variation of the expertise
argument, DOJ also stresses the fact that it is a neutral and objective evaluator of the agency's case. In the words of Edward
Schmults, former Deputy Attorney General: "The Attorney
General's role in providing neutral, dispassionate analysis of and
advice concerning controversial issues cannot be overstated."55
This objectivity is two-fold. First, the DOJ is not involved in the
particulars of agency policymaking and its attorneys will not have
their judgment skewed by a personal stake in the matter at hand.
Second, it lies in the separation of the prosecutorial function from
the investigatory and regulatory functions. This, asserts Schmults,
"has proven to be helpful in assuring that litigation is initiated

52. E.g., Babcock, supra note 48, at 186.
53. See, e.g., Proceedings, supra note 49, at 175 (statement of Associate
Attorney General Michael Egan) ("[T]he Department of Justice ideally should
have the best litigators there are in the United States, and to the extent that we
start deffusing [sic] among agencies, litigation expertise, the whole thing will go
down.").
54. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE JUROCRACY: GOVERNMENT
AGENCY PROGRAMS, AND JuDIcLAL DECISIONS 130 (1976).

LAWYERS,

55. Letter from Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Attorney General, to Rep. James
Florio, May 4, 1983, at 2, in Hazardous Waste Control and Enforcement Act of
1983: Hearingsbefore the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation,and Tourism
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 387, 388

(1983).
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upon an objective, independent evaluation of the factual and legal
basis of each case. 56
B. The Agency Perspective on DOJ Control of Litigation
The agencies are rather underwhelmed by this catalogue of
benefits. In part, this is the expected personal and professional resentment that naturally results from being told to step aside by
someone with greater power and prestige (who is often also
younger and with less experience) just when a controversy becomes most important and most interesting. 7 In addition, from
the point of view of the agency, the necessity for speaking with
one voice is far less obvious than it is to DOJ, and the likelihood
of it actually occurring in the large bulk of agency-specific litigation is rather remote.
Beyond simply being unconvinced by DOJ's arguments, the
agencies perceive a host of difficulties resulting from centralizing
litigation authority in the Department. 8 In large measure, these
are intensely practical. Referring cases to DOJ and relying on it
to pursue them is wasteful, time-consuming, and expensive. Cases
are redundantly staffed. DOJ does not adequately consult with the
agency or involve its attorneys in briefing and arguing cases.
Notwithstanding their vaunted expertise in litigation, DOJ lawyers
lack the technical expertise and specialized background in the
particular statutory regimes of the individual agencies. The divergence here is more than one of different areas of expertise. As a
generalization, there is a difference in lawyering style. DOJ has a
greater tendency to rely on "technical" arguments such as sover56. Id. at 389.
57. See, e.g., Wallace H. Johnson, Our Nation's Energy and Resources-Decision Making in Conflict, 23 JOHN MARSHALL L. REv. 197, 200
(1990) (former chief of the Lands Division observing that "client agency lawyers
were often professionally unfulfilled, being limited to taking recommendations.
Understandably, they wanted the power and opportunity to follow a litigation
matter through to its conclusion"). On this tension, see generally JOEL A. MINTZ,
ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 76-77 (1995)
(noting destructive "institutional rivalry" that peaked in the late 1970s and mid to
late 1980s, prompting "discord between the agency and its Justice Department
attorneys [that] affected enforcement in all environmental media").
58. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 332-37 (1977).
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eign immunity, lack of jurisdiction, statute of limitations, and so
on - defenses that win the case but do nothing to advance the
agency's programmatic agenda. By the same token, agencies are
somewhat more inclined to run litigation risks - willing to lose
the case (which is a means, not an end) in the hope of advancing
that agenda.
Furthermore, where DOJ asserts the need to reconcile different
agency positions and ensure intra-executive uniformity, the agencies see only a conflict of interest. Because DOJ represents multiple federal agencies, and because different agencies' interests will
not always align precisely, the current arrangement is rife with
the potential for conflicts of interest that would be unacceptable
in the private sector. These may be indirect, as where DOJ takes
a position on behalf of one agency that is in the abstract in tension with another's agenda or goals, or, the conflict may be quite
direct, where DOJ's representation of one governmental interest
leads to a direct interference with another's policy program or
goals.
The working relationship between DOJ and EPA is often difficult and strained. As the former head of EPA's enforcement
division put it in a letter to the head of the Environment Division,
a "division ... has infused itself between our two agencies"
characterized by a "'them vs. us' perception that we have long
been working to overcome."59

59. Letter from Earl E. Devaney, Director, EPA Office of Criminal Enforcement, to Vicki A. O'Meara, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Environment and
Natural Resources Division, at 2 (Dec. 22, 1992), in 1993 Dingell Hearing,supra
note 14, at 420, 421. Sniping over lawyering authority in itself has costs; it is a
distraction, lowers morale, and undermines effective working relationships. As a
former head of the Environmental Crimes Section has written:
The environmental enforcement program is ... plagued by constant

turf fights between the DOJ and EPA over who will actually litigate
the cases in court. The tension from these turf battles is always simmering, and frequently affects the relationship between the DOJ attorney and his EPA counterpart. Unfortunately, such tension is an unnecessary drain of energy that could be better spent in developing and
prosecuting enforcement cases.
Judson W. Starr, Too Many Cooks ....ENvTL. F. (Jan./Feb. 1989) at 9, 11.
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C. EPA and DOJ: Civil JudicialEnforcement
A civil judicial environmental enforcement action begins with a
referral from EPA to DOJ. DOJ will not go ahead with a civil action on its own initiative; its only authority is to proceed on
EPA's behalf. If DOJ does decline, EPA can in theory proceed on
its own, as this Article discusses below. Declinations of EPA
civil referrals are fairly rare,' in part because of the possibility
of EPA representing itself.6
Several of the environmental statutes do contain exceptions to
the Attorney General's exclusive representation. The CAA,62 the
CWA,63 and the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA")64 all provide that the Administrator shall first request the Attorney General for representation in a civil action; if the Attorney General
declines, EPA attorneys shall represent the agency.65 The Toxic

60. Exact figures on the frequency of declinations are not published. By comparing EPA's figures on referrals with DOJ's figures for cases initiated, a rough
estimate can be made, however. See Hodas, supra note 41, at 1613-14 & n.348.
By comparing EPA and DOJ figures for FY 1989 through FY 1993, Hodas comes up with an overall acceptance rate of 78% (using EPA figures) or 83% (using DOJ figures). Id. It is unclear whether this is limited to civil referrals or
includes criminal referrals as well.
DOJ virtually never declines to defend EPA (or any other agency) in lawsuits brought against the government. The author is aware of only one case in
which EPA defended itself in court with its own lawyers after DOJ refused to
represent it. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 631 F.2d 922 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). The agency won.
61. It is unclear to what extent DOJ is concerned about the possibility of EPA
pursuing a case without it. It has almost never happened, and so hardly seems an
imminent threat. On the other hand, one reason it has never happened is surely
that DOJ is unlikely to decline a case that EPA so firmly believes in that it will
proceed on its own.
The reasons for the low number of declinations go beyond a simple desire
to avoid EPA going into court on its own. To some extent, DOJ does see EPA as
a client, and if the client wants to bring a suit, then the lawyer's job is to bring it.
Cf. supra note 6 (higher declination rate in criminal cases). And to some extent
EPA is careful about what it refers, because it does not want to be turned down.
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q, CAA §§ 101-618 (1994).
63. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, CWA §§ 101-607 (1994).
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26, Public Health Service Act §§ 1401-1464
(1994) & Pub. L. 100-572 § 4 (1988).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 7605, CAA § 305 (1994); 33 U.S.C. § 1366, CWA § 506
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Substances Control Act ("TSCA") 6 allows the Administrator to
use her own attorneys to bring a civil action in the case of an
imminent hazard even without approaching DOJ.67
However, EPA virtually never uses its theoretical authority to
represent itself. In 1977, DOJ and EPA negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") concerning the handling of civil
litigation in which the agency is a party.6" The MOU remains in
effect today. Under the MOU, the Attorney General ("AG")
"shall have control over all cases" in which the agency is a party.69 EPA is entitled to designate an attorney to participate in the
litigation, even though that attorney "shall be subject to the supervision and control of' the AG.7" Agency attorneys cannot
make any filings without the AG's approval. They may discuss
the case with DOJ attorneys, help prepare and sign papers, engage in settlement discussions, and may be allowed to argue orally. However, DOJ attorneys take the lead role; they are listed first
on all filings, make ultimate decisions concerning strategy and
the contents of papers submitted to the court, and make virtually
all oral arguments.71 The author's review of sixty cases decided
between January 1993 and October 1994, in which EPA was a
party, showed that DOJ attorneys argued fifty-five, EPA attorneys
two, and the agencies shared oral argument in four.
Congress has seriously considered giving EPA its own litigating authority on several occasions. The MOU was negotiated in
the shadow of an explicit and apparently serious threat from
Congress to give EPA authority to represent itself should it and
DOJ be unable to reach an agreement.72 The 1984 RCRA

(1994); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(f), SWDA § 1450(0 (1994).
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 2606(e), TSCA § 7(e) (1994) ("Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, in any action under subsection (a) of this section [concerning

imminent chemical hazards], the Administrator may direct attorneys of the [EPA]
to appear and represent the Administrator in such an action.").
68. U.S. DOJ, Memorandum of Understanding Between Department of Justice
and Environmental Protection Agency, 42 Fed. Reg. 48,942 (1977).

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 48,943.
Id.
Id.
The House version of what became the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments
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Amendments almost included a provision giving EPA litigation
authority. 73 This issue has come up on other occasions as well.
In general, Congress perceives, rightly, that EPA is more committed to enforcement than DOJ. To the extent that moves to shift
authority to EPA reflect a reasoned policy judgment, rather than a
mere political bargaining chip or an evaluation of whom Congress can most easily control, Congress becomes interested in
having EPA (or any agency) handle its own litigation when it
most doubts the current administration's commitment to enforcement.
D. EPA and DOJ: The Criminal Side
To some extent, the criminal enforcement regime duplicates the
civil. 74 EPA has its own criminal investigatory apparatus, and it
will make an initial decision whether to pursue a case as a criminal or a civil matter. If and when it refers to DOJ, EPA will
request criminal or civil prosecution. However, DOJ can bring a
criminal environmental prosecution without a referral from EPA.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and others also
undertake criminal investigations. In addition, DOJ brings a prosecution on behalf of the United States, not the Administrator. As
a result, DOJ's criminal environmental enforcement program
operates with greater independence from EPA than does its civil
judicial enforcement program.
The decision to proceed with a criminal investigation is made
by EPA's Office of Criminal Enforcement.75 EPA's efforts are
supplemented by agents from the FBI.76 Between 1988 and
explicitly provided for EPA litigating authority. See H.R. REP. No. 294, supra
note 5, at 332-37. The final legislation provided that litigation should take place
"in accordance with" the MOU. 42 U.S.C. § 7605(b), CAA § 305(b) (1977).
73. Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
74. For a full account of the process of criminal investigation and prosecution,
see ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LIABILrrY, supra note 29.
75. See Devaney Memorandum, supra note 29, at 1-2.
76. See Memorandum of Understanding between the Office of Enforcement
Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investiga-

tion (1982).
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1993, for example, over 61% of criminal referrals came from
EPA and 34% came from DOJ investigators, with almost all of
the latter coming from the FBI." Almost all of the FBI's environmental investigations are conducted in conjunction with EPA
or other agencies.7" The decision to proceed with a criminal
prosecution, as opposed to a criminal investigation, is up to DOJ.
However, EPA makes what is in essence a recommendation by
referring a case for criminal prosecution.
The role of EPA attorneys in criminal prosecutions is less
significant than in civil cases. In the latter, DOJ takes the lead,
but EPA is part of the litigating team. In criminal cases, EPA
truly is just a counseling agency, helping to build a case. While
each EPA Region has a Regional Criminal Enforcement Counsel
("RCEC"), that office works to prepare cases, not to litigate them
or present them to a grand jury. Indeed, the RCEC's status as
"odd man out" in criminal prosecutions has been a source of
tension between the agency and the department.79
The one exception to this arrangement is the occasional appointment of an EPA attorney as a "Special Assistant U.S. Attorney." DOJ, however, is wary of granting such status freely. Prior
to the August 1994 bluesheet, this reluctance was palpable in the
U.S. Attorneys' Manual.8" Indeed, the January 1993 revision,
since withdrawn, expressly stated that only in the event that no
Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") or ECS attorney was
available would DOJ "resort to other resources, such as agency
counsel."" During preparation of the January 1993 revisions, the
head of EPA's enforcement office objected to the exclusion of
EPA attorneys from criminal prosecutions. The Acting Assistant
AG for the Environment Division responded:

77. See 1993 Dingell Hearing, supra note 14, at 78 (statement of L. Nye
Stevens).
78. Id. at n.13.
79. WILLIAM J. CORCORAN ET AL., UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTERNAL REvIEw OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES PRO-

GRAM 146-52 (Mar. 10, 1994) [hereinafter DOJ INTERNAL REvIEw] (noting that
disputes over the proper role of RCECs is "[another source of tension between
the EPA and the ECS"); id. at 151; Letter from Earl E. Devaney, supra note 59.

80. USAM, supra note 29, § 5-11.312 (10/1/88); id. (1/12/93 Bluesheet).
81. Id. § 5-11.303(E) (1/12/93 Bluesheet).
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It is always important for federal enforcement employees to
work together to bring about the best possible result. This does not
mean, however, that RCECs, or any Agency counsel, should prosecute environmental cases. The role of litigator is that of the Department of Justice under the overall direction of the Attorney
General. It is our view that Agency counsel should only litigate a
lacking or when there is a
criminal case when DOJ resources 8are
2
resources.
those
supplement
need to
The current USAM simply provides that appointment of Special
Assistant U.S. Attorneys shall be approved by the local U.S.
Attorney and by the head of the Environment Division, who
"should seek to ensure sensible and efficient use of government
83
resources."
EPA's role in criminal cases is relatively less significant not
only in the actual handling of the case but in the decision to
bring it in the first place. First, in a civil case DOJ will not proceed without its "client." In the words of the USAM, "[a]s a
matter of policy and practice, civil prosecutions are initiated at
the request of the Administrator" of the EPA or other relevant
agency head.84 Indeed, the most plausible reading of the statutes
is that DOJ could not proceed in a civil case without EPA even if
it wanted to. Should DOJ learn of possible violations warranting
investigation, it will forward the information to EPA; an actual
civil prosecution will not go forward unless and until EPA refers
the case to DOJ." In contrast, in criminal prosecutions DOJ is
permitted to, and sometimes does, proceed without an EPA referral.86 In addition, DOJ by no means automatically pursues an
EPA criminal referral; its declination rate is higher in criminal
than in civil cases87 and the recurrent tension between DOJ and
82. Letter from Vicki A. O'Meara, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Earl
E. Devaney, Director, EPA Office of Criminal Enforcement 2 (Jan. 19, 1993),
reprinted in 1993 Dingell Hearing,supra note 14, at 433-34.
83. USAM, supra, note 29, § 5-11.110 (8/23/94 Bluesheet).
84. Id. § 5-12.111(A).
85. Id. § 5-12.111(B).
86. Id.
87. In the early years of the criminal enforcement program the declination rate
was as high as 60%. Starr, supra note 7, at 907 (describing period from 197981).
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EPA over the quality of EPA referrals is especially pronounced in
the criminal setting."8 In a criminal case, DOJ represents the
United States; EPA is not its client and DOJ's decision whether
to prosecute is relatively autonomous. 9
III. ALLOCATING CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITY
The battle over the relative roles of Main Justice and the
USAOs raged without a thought given to the possible place of
EPA in the overall arrangement. 9 As we have seen, however,
the role of EPA lawyers in the agency's litigation is a matter of
longstanding discussion and controversy.9 Although this controversy has focused on civil litigation, EPA has also sought, to a
limited extent, a greater courtroom role in criminal prosecutions.92 Some commentators have argued EPA should possess
some independent criminal enforcement authority.93 This Section

88. See DOJ INTERNAL REvIEW, supra note 79.
89. Lazarus, supra note 1, at 2460.
90. A fact that did not go unnoticed by EPA and its supporters. See, e.g.,
Howard Berman, Ex-EPA Staffer Says Environmental Crime Needs Open Debate,
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 10, 1992, at 25 (letter to the editor) (stressing central but
overlooked role of EPA in environmental criminal enforcement in response to
DOJ's defense of the ECS's performance); Letter from John Voorhees to Janet
Reno (June 23, 1993) at 3, reprinted in 1993 Dingell Hearing, supra note 14, at
463-65 (objecting that EPA's "career professionals were not even consulted to assist in the preparation of the guidelines," i.e. the bluesheet revision, and that
DOJ's "failure ... to contact EPA contributes to the specter of impropriety").
91. Supra nn. 43-59 and accompanying text.
92. See DOJ INTERNAL REvIEw, supra note 79, at 146-52 (noting strains
between ECS and EPA and desire of many RCECs to participate in prosecutions); Letter from Earl E. Devaney, Director, EPA Office of Criminal Enforcement, to Vicki A. O'Meara, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Environment and
Natural Resources Division, at 2 (Dec. 22, 1992), reprinted in 1993 Dingell
Hearing, supra note 14, at 420-21 (objecting to bluesheet revisions that leave
EPA attorneys out of the picture).
93. Writing about environmental crimes in 1991, Robert Adler and Charles
Lord, of the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., urged that EPA be given
greater independent enforcement authority. While conceding that DOJ should be
"brought in for the most egregious violations that require more complex enforcement actions[,]" Adler and Lord felt that EPA should be able to act on its own
for initial or less complicated violations. Robert W. Adler & Charles Lord, Environmental Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 781, 812 (1991).
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considers whether in fact EPA should represent the government
in criminal environmental prosecutions. It concludes that it should
not, because DOJ control (or, more precisely, shared control) is
an important structural protection against prosecutorial overreaching with only minor costs.
A. Vigorous Enforcement
Much of the debate that has taken place about the allocation of
prosecutorial authority concerns whether enforcement is sufficiently vigorous. Although prosecutorial timidity is worth worrying about, the question this Article examines is in some ways the
opposite: viz., what allocation of prosecutorial authority will
ensure that enforcement is not too vigorous?
1. EPA vs. DOJ
EPA refers more cases than DOJ brings; its attorneys are generally more committed to the environmental cause.9 4 The duplication of effort inherent in referral by EPA and prosecution by
DOJ automatically reduces enforcement resources. In light of this,
it would seem that enforcement would be enhanced by allowing
EPA to bring its own prosecutions.95 The concern, however, is
with agency lawyers armed with independent criminal prosecution
authority going too far.

94. Again, DOJ's common argument that the neutral, distanced perspective of
the generalist is necessary to counter the tunnel vision of the agency is much less
applicable in the environmental setting (or tax, antitrust, or civil rights settings,
for that matter), where DOJ also has specialized attorneys whose choice of a
career likely reflects some sympathy for a particular policy agenda.
95. See Adler & Lord, supra note 93, at 812. I would note too much can be
read into these factors. In particular, the fact that EPA refers more cases than
DOJ is willing to prosecute does not mean that EPA would prosecute all the
cases it refers if it had the authority to do so. At present, EPA (and EPA's
overseers) measure enforcement success by how many cases are referred. For the
U.S. Attorney, in contrast, the measure of success is how many cases she wins,
making her far more risk averse in litigation. Furthermore, EPA can refer borderline cases because it knows DOJ is there as a screen. If EPA had DOJ's job, it
would behave more like DOJ.
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a. Single-mindedness
Generations of administrative law scholars and DOJ attorneys
have assumed that agencies have tunnel vision and are unable to
perceive countervailing factors that would make a reasonable
person hesitate about the agency's single-minded pursuit of its
particular mission. If the problem is prosecution for morally
blameless conduct that violates an incomprehensible technicality,
then EPA attorneys with specialized expertise and commitment to
environmental law are more likely to fall prey to such overreaching. Not only are they likely to have a commitment to environmental enforcement, but they know the statutes perhaps too well,
failing to appreciate how overwhelming and confusing they are to
someone whose entire job is not devoted to understanding them.
b. Lawyering styles
Certain differences in lawyering style can be identified between
DOJ and EPA. These are dangerous generalizations, of course,
and one can find many counterexamples. Furthermore, were EPA
to be granted independent litigating authority, its lawyers' style
would likely change to look more like DOJ's. Nonetheless, two
general points can be made. Because DOJ lawyers are, relatively
speaking, generalists without an affiliation to a particular programmatic agenda, they tend to be more interested in "technical"
lawyer's arguments, and less willing to run litigation risks, than
their agency counterparts. These attributes can be frustrating to
agency lawyers, particularly in defensive cases, but they are important safeguards in the criminal context.
c. An example
A well-known dispute between DOJ and EPA, involving civil
rather than criminal enforcement, illustrates this divergence.96 In
the mid-1970s, EPA referred cases to DOJ for judicial enforcement even where no showing of harm could be made - for
example, where the violation was purely "procedural" (e.g., involving monitoring or recordkeeping requirements). DOJ often

96. The following account is taken from PETER CLEARY YEAGER, THE LIMrrs
OF LAW: THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE POLLUTION 259-63 (1991).
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declined to pursue these cases. This led to a memorandum from
EPA headquarters to DOJ, accusing the latter of "amending" the
statute and asking DOJ to inform the U.S. Attorneys "of the
correct interpretation of [EPA] statutes and the importance of
prosecuting [EPA] enforcement cases without requiring proof of
harm., 9 7 DOJ responded that it did not endorse a flat refusal to
reject referrals in cases where there was no proof of environmental harm. However, it insisted that in its experience "the only
assured way of receiving meaningful relief is a showing by the
Government of some adverse effect of the defendant's pollutants,
and in addition, some courts require it. This is a fact which cannot be ignored." 98 It accordingly declined to issue any hard and
fast rule to the U.S. Attorneys, leaving degree of harm as one
factor relevant to the prosecutor's discretionary decision to go
ahead.
This is the sort of disagreement one would expect. EPA focuses on its statutes rather than the general principles of liability or
of prosecutorial strategy. In Richard Lazarus's terms, EPA's
position represents an overzealous failure to integrate environmental law - with its risk-based, prophylactic, complex requirements - into more general principles. 99
2. Main Justice vs. the U.S. Attorneys Offices
Representative Dingell was convinced that (at least in Republican administrations) political pressure to go easy on environmental enforcement was most effectively brought to bear on Main
Justice."° In certain cases, depending on who happens to be
working in a particular USAO, he is probably correct. This, how-

97. Id. at 261 (quoting EPA Headquarters Enforcement Memorandum, regarding correspondence between EPA and the Justice Department on problems in
enforcement, Dec. 3, 1976) [hereinafter, EPA Enforcement Memorandum].
98. Id. at 262 (quoting EPA Enforcement Memorandum).

99. See Lazarus, supra note 1.
100. See 1993 Dingell Hearing, supra note 14, at 208 (statement of Rep.
Dingell) (referring to the "perception," which he evidently shared, "that centralizing decision-making on environmental cases in Washington, D.C., opens the door
to special preference, influence peddling, and invites the use of pressure and
special privilege ...

on behalf of the rich and powerful").
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ever, is not because Main Justice is accessible and partisan while
the USAOs are not. On the contrary, as then Associate Attorney
General Webster Hubbell responded to Dingell, "I don't know
that political pressure is limited to Washington, D.C.''. Indeed,
local susceptibility to political pressure has been a complaint of
the environmental defense bar: "Th[e] growing independence [of
the USAOs] presents a serious problem for many companies
facing RCRA enforcement actions, as the [USAOs] are typically
more political than the Environment Division at DOJ headquarters."' 2
This is hardly a surprise, given that the position of U.S. Attorney is a common stepping stone to elected office - something
that is completely untrue of positions with the Environment Division. There is, therefore, more reason to worry about politics, or
at least political ambition, infecting prosecutorial decisions locally
than in Washington. In New York, for example, Dennis Vacco,
the state Attorney General, an elected official, is the former U.S.
Attorney for the Western District of New York, and the Mayor of
New York City, Rudolph Giuliani, is the former U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of New York. Indeed, Mayor Giuliani
gained popularity by bringing a series of highly publicized, quite
controversial white collar prosecutions. Many of the resulting
convictions were overturned on appeal,0 3 and there is a strong
school of thought that holds that these prosecutions were wholly

101. Id. (testimony of Webster L. Hubbell, Assoc. Att'y Gen.). See also
Galacatos, supra note 3, at 656 (suggesting that risk of partisan pressure infecting

prosecutorial decisions is roughly equal in the U.S. Attorneys Offices and at
Main Justice).

102. THE RCRA PRACTICE MANuAL 225 (Theodore L. Garrett ed., 1994).
103. United States v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1991), 946 F.2d 188 (2d

Cir. 1991) (setting aside securities convictions of four of six defendants); United
States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1991) (setting aside conviction).
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misguided," 4 nonetheless, they helped make Giuliani
mayor. 5
This is not to say that politically ambitious U.S. Attorneys will
always be aggressive environmental prosecutors. To the contrary,
political responsiveness cuts both ways; prosecutors have a long
tradition of winking at offenses by locally prominent figures or
important corporations. In the vast majority of USAOs, no one is
especially interested in or enthusiastic about environmental criminal prosecutions. In many situations, then, it seems likely that
decentralization will reduce enforcement.
By comparison, ECS is more isolated and less accessible and
more reliably committed to environmental prosecutions. To the
extent that ECS is subject to outside pressure, it is likely to be
pressured to hold off rather than pressured to pursue. Overall, the
happy balance of attention to environmental crimes and overall
restraint is more likely to come from ECS than local U.S. Attorneys.
3. Summary
One would expect the most vigorous broad-based environmental enforcement from EPA; the least from AUSAs (with isolated
but highly visible and troubling individual counter-examples); and
something in-between from ECS. The reality is probably not so
different. A focus on individual instances (which may have been
misinterpreted)" ° at the expense of what is essentially invisible
104. See generally DANIEL FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY
MICHAEL MILKEN AND HIs FINANCIAL REVOLUTION (1995). Something of the

political flavor surrounding the office is discerned in the comment by Armand
D'Amato, the brother of Senator Alfonse D'Amato, after his mail-fraud conviction was overturned by the Second Circuit. D'Amato called himself the victim of

"a baseless prosecution comparable to the ones Rudy Giuliani brought against innocent people on Wall Street." Alison Mitchell, The 1994 Campaign: Mayor,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1994, at B5.
105. See generally JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991). For example,
Stewart writes that, as of May 1987, "Giuliani had had a remarkable string of
highly publicized successes ....

He had reaped further praise for the Boesky plea

agreement and his crackdown on Wall Street. Giuliani was on a roll, one that
could easily propel him into New York City's mayoral mansion, or the state
governor's mansion." Id. at 341.
106. See DOJ INTERNAL REvIEw, supra note 79; Lazarus, supra note 1, at
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- the complete inaction in districts bringing no cases at all - is
highly misleading. If one sought a structure that assured meaningful, consistent, but not unrestrained criminal enforcement, it
would look much like the one we already have.
B. Centralizationand Consistency
The familiar arguments for DOJ control of federal litigation, in
general, turn largely on the benefits of centralization - of having
a single, coherent decisionmaker who understands the big picture.
This argument rings somewhat hollow if the theoretical centralized decisionmaker in turn delegates decision-making authority to
dozens of autonomous offices around the country. Yet that is exactly the arrangement that prevails with regard to federal criminal
prosecutions. In considering the structural protection offered by
assigning litigation responsibility to particular attorneys, this
Article considers both the relationship between DOJ and EPA
and the relationship between Main Justice and the U.S. Attorneys
offices.
In the environmental crimes setting, DOJ's one voice mantra is
focused on the importance of consistency in charging decisions.
According to the DOJ Internal Review:
[T]he federal environmental statutes pose special enforcement
problems with respect to uniform application of the law. On the
other hand, environmental laws, like other laws, should be interpreted and applied consistently, so that the law evolves in an orderly fashion and every citizen is subject to the same legal requirements. Thus, there is a need for some mechanism to ensure that
these complex, technical, and frequently ambiguous statutes and
regulations are interpreted consistently across the Nation. But on
the other hand, the decision whether to prosecute a particular
violation always involves an element of discretion, and the deci-

sion whether to prosecute an environmental violation may properly
turn on regional or local concerns that reflect the affected
community's priorities and needs."

Because the sanction is so severe and the stakes are so high,
the norm of treating like cases alike is especially compelling

2496-2507.

107. DOJ INTERNAL REvIEw, supra note 79, at 47.
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here. The same impulse that lies behind the creation of the sentencing guidelines, which were supposed to eliminate disparities
in the sentencing of similar defendants who had committed similar crimes, of course applies to the criminal enforcement regime
generally.
It is simply not tenable to deny that fairness and consistency
are enhanced by centralization. This is plainly an argument for
placing authority in Main Justice rather than the U.S. Attorneys
offices. It is also an argument for placing authority in DOJ rather
than EPA, although the matter is more complicated. The usual
claim, that overall governmental consistency is served by centralizing litigation in DOJ, ought to apply here because EPA might
overemphasize environmental prosecutions at the expense of other
criminal enforcement priorities. One caveat is in order, however.
Because DOJ has a separate environmental division, and an environmental crimes section within that division, there is some of
the same risk of tunnel vision that would exist if criminal prosecution were left to EPA. This concern returns us to the relationship between Main Justice and the USAOs, as the latter may have
the advantage of non-specialization over ECS.
C. Alternatives to Criminal Enforcement
It is not only important that EPA cannot bring judicial enforcement actions; it is also important that it can bring administrative
enforcement actions without DOJ. Although highly visible and
much discussed, criminal prosecutions remain a tiny part of overall environmental enforcement. The real environmental enforcement program takes place outside of the courts altogether; EPA's
administrative enforcement efforts dwarf both civil and criminal
actions. For FY 1994, the respective numbers were:
3,600
Administrative enforcements (total):
1,596
Administrative penalty actions:
403
Civil Referrals to DOJ:
Criminal Referrals to DOJ:

220108

108. 1994 EPA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 4-2, 4-4, 4-8. Possible

monetary penalties are comparable in all three regimes. Under the Clean Air Act,
for example, civil judicial penalties and administrative penalties both have a
maximum of $25,000 per day per violation, although the latter cannot exceed a

712 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
Reliance on administrative sanctions has increased steadily over
the years, in part because Congress has several times amended
the relevant statutes to increase EPA's administrative enforcement
authority. For example, the 1972 Clean Water Act authorized
administrative penalties only for oil spills and violations of marine sanitation device requirements. °9 Extensive amendments in
1987 authorized EPA to assess administrative penalties for virtually any violation of the Act."' Similarly, the 1970 Clean Air
Act provided for administrative penalties in Section 120,"' but
the formula for actually calculating the penalties was so unwieldy
and complex that this authority was little utilized." 2 As part of
the 1990 Amendments, Congress greatly enlarged the agency's
administrative enforcement authority, broadening the types of
violations subject to administrative compliance orders, giving
EPA authority to issue administrative penalty orders, and adding
a field citation program. "3
Faced with a range of enforcement options, EPA will almost
always proceed administratively. As one regional attorney stated:
total of $200,000. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(b)-(c), CAA §§ 113(b)-(c) (1994). In practice penalties actually imposed are, not surprisingly, smallest in administrative
cases and largest in criminal cases, reflecting the fact that EPA turns to these different mechanisms according to the seriousness of the underlying violation. Thus
for FY 1994 the 250 criminal defendants were assessed $36.8 million in fines
and 99 years in prison; the 166 civil defendants were assessed almost $65.7 million in penalties; and the 1596 administrative penalty orders totalled $48 million.
1994 EPA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 4-3, 4-5.
109. Hodas, supra note 41, at 1583 n.158.
110. See Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 46 (codified as Clean Water Act
§ 309(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (1994)).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 7420, CAA § 120 (1994).
112. See James Miskiewicz & John S. Rudd, Civil and Criminal Enforcement
of the Clean Air Act After the 1990 Amendments, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 281,
308-10 (1992).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d), CAA § 113(d) (1994). See generally Miskiewicz &
Rudd, supra note 112, at 308-16. EPA's other statutes also provide for broad
administrative enforcement authority. Indeed, TSCA and Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") provide only for administrative penalties; while such penalties are subject to judicial review and judicial enforcement,
neither Act provides for judicially imposed fines. 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a), FIFRA
§ 14(a) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a), TSCA § 16(a) (1994).
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"If I have a choice I will always go the administrative route
except with the truly recalcitrant, hard-core, repeat violator.""' 4
There are many reasons for EPA's preference for administrative
enforcement, including its relative informality and speed. But one
significant part of the explanation is that the agency handles
administrative cases entirely on its own. EPA thus avoids the
headaches of working with (or for) DOJ, while ensuring that it
5
receives full credit."
Rightly or wrongly, some cases are handled administratively
instead of ending up in the courts because of the division of
lawyering tasks. Some commentators have objected that this
undermines enforcement." 6 However, if one is worried about
114. Interview with Walter Mugdan, Acting Regional Counsel, U.S. EPA,
Region II, in New York, N.Y. (Apr. 4, 1994).
115. A criminal prosecution can be a frustrating and demoralizing experience
for the agency attorney.
The agency attorneys assigned to the local federal prosecutor are
usually treated as "second class" assistants .... [T]he agency attorneys feel that they are asked to act as "clerks" for the local prosecutor. There is a reluctance among many agency attorneys to work with
a local federal prosecutor. There is not "status," no enjoyment in
prosecuting a case, and certainly no "glory." When the matter is finally prosecuted, if it succeeds, the U.S. Attorney receives the glory and
credit. If it fails, the agency often gets the blame.
August Bequai, White-Collar Plea Bargaining,TRIAL, July 1977, at 38, 41.
116. Peter Yeager ascribes inadequate Clean Water Act enforcement in part to
the regulatory competition between EPA and DOJ, stating that "the agency refrains from referring some prosecutable cases because the EPA does not wish to
share credit for the case with the department." Peter Cleary Yeager, Industrial
Water Pollution, in BEYOND THE LAW: CRIME IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS 97,
139 (Michael Tonry & Albert J. Reiss, Jr. eds., 1993) (vol. 18 of CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH). By "get[ting] sole enforcement credit" in this

way, the agency will "have a stronger regulatory record to show its superiors and
congressional oversight committees when annual budgets are requested." Id.
Yeager quotes the Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles as somewhat
petulantly complaining about this phenomenon:
In fact, many cases by the noncriminal investigative agencies -by
that I mean the regulatory agencies - never get presented to the U.S.
Attorney's Office. A very significant reason why they don't ... is
because the agency gets no credit for a criminal prosecution. The
agency gets credit for civil action ... that it can file and that its lawyers can handle, but the agency gets no statistical credit at budget
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overprosecution, the availability and, from EPA's perspective,
greater attractiveness of the administrative alternative is an important safety valve that would be undercut, though not eliminated,
were EPA to handle both types of enforcement itself.
D. Expertise
The final standard argument for DOJ litigating authority is that
the agency's substantive expertise is outweighed by the
department's litigation expertise. In the environmental crimes
setting, Main Justice tries to have it both ways on this score. On
the one hand, vis-a-vis EPA, DOJ's stance is that DOJ lawyers
are experienced prosecutors whereas EPA lawyers have never
seen the inside of a courtroom. But, vis-a-vis the USAOs, DOJ
stands this argument on its head. The claim is now that Main
Justice (in the form of the Environmental Crimes Section) must
be involved in prosecutions because it does have specialized
expertise in environmental law, whereas lawyers in the USAOs
are generalists
insufficiently familiar with those arcane complexin7
ties.

time for a criminal case that has been prosecuted.
The best example is that for the last three years the United
States Attorney in Los Angeles... has been trying to get the United
States government more actively involved in environmental prosecutions ....

But when the EPA takes a look at a case, very often we

never even hear about it. They handle it either administratively or
civilly and they will not bring the U.S. Attorney's Office into it for
criminal prosecution.
Id. at 139-40 (quoting Richard E. Drooyan). Drooyan's remarks are slightly
dated but not inapplicable to the present day.
117. I will stay out of the expertise battle between Main Justice and the
USAOs, other than to make three short points. First, some members of the defense bar have objected that AUSAs do lack adequate familiarity with the fine
points of environmental law. Theodore Garret writes:
[T]he [AUSAs] in the field often lack the RCRA expertise of their
colleagues at DOJ headquarters. The combined result may be that the
lead prosecutor in a particular case has an incomplete understanding
of how EPA has interpreted the relevant RCRA regulations, or a lack
of perspective on the significance of the alleged violations, or both.
RCRA PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 102, at 225.
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Whether DOJ or EPA has the relatively stronger position in the
expertise debate depends on the type of case. In a petition for
review of an agency regulation, the agency lawyer's familiarity
with the details and history of the statute, regulation, and overall
regulatory scheme are an important advantage, not much outweighed by less litigation experience. In the criminal setting,
however, the situation is just the opposite. There are separate litigation skills, wholly independent of the particular substantive law
violated, in criminal prosecutions - more so than in any other
area of litigation. As many have noted, environmental attorneys
learned this the hard way in the early 1980s."'8 Technical environmental expertise is much less important. Indeed, if one really
needs the highly specialized understanding of the statutes found
only in EPA and not in the Environment Division or the USAO
to prosecute a case effectively, it is a case that should not have
been brought as a criminal prosecution in the first place. Even if
one thinks, as the author does, that the chorus of complaints
about inappropriate criminal prosecutions for "technical" violations is overstated, it does not sit well to insist that an effective
criminal prosecution requires the extraordinary specialized expertise of an EPA attorney because it is beyond the ken of other
government lawyers (and so also, presumably, generalist judges
and lay juries).
Lastly, DOJ claims a sort of expertise arising from its neutrality and objectivity. As a general proposition this is a valid but
limited point, much diluted by the existence of a separate Environment Division. It has some force, however, in the environmen-

Second, environmental law is extraordinarily technical and complex. See
generally Lazarus, supra note 1, at 2428-38.
Third, it is impossible to generalize about this concern, because the level
of familiarity with environmental law minutia varies hugely from one USAO to
another.
118. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 1, at 2460-61; Starr, supra note 7, at 907.

The usual example of an EPA attorney in over his head is United States v. Gold,
470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (holding that the EPA lawyer's appearance
before the grand jury as both attorney and witness resulted in the dismissal of the
indictment). See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 2460-61 n.240; DOJ INTERNAL REVIEw, supra note 79, at 57 & n.62, 152-58 [between nn. 186 & 197); Starr, supra
note 7, at 906.
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tal crimes setting. Environmental enforcement is multi-tiered; it
never begins (and should never begin) with a criminal prosecution. A matter usually only reaches the prosecution stage when
the defendant is a repeat violator, or particularly recalcitrant, and
administrative efforts to achieve compliance have failed." 9 By
this stage, EPA and the defendant know each other. The dispute
can easily become personal. An inappropriate prosecution would
be particularly likely to occur when the prosecutor is angry at the
defendant and has a personal stake in the prosecution. Therefore,
turning to a new attorney outside EPA is an important protection.
E. Increasing EPA's Role to ProtectDefendants
Two possible reforms could bolster the protections provided by
enforcement structures against overzealous environmental prosecutions. Both involve a greater role for EPA, but without giving
it the power to bring environmental prosecutions.
First, as discussed earlier, the fact that EPA handles administrative enforcement without DOJ is one factor keeping cases out of
the courts. Taking this principle a step further, one might give
EPA exclusive authority to handle civil judicial enforcement,
thereby creating an automatic EPA preference for civil over criminal enforcement and keeping borderline cases on the civil side.
While this change would probably have the intended effect, it
would be a mistake. First, it would be incomplete, as DOJ does
not depend on EPA for all its criminal referrals and DOJ could
generate criminal cases on its own even if EPA referred none at
all. Second, the question of whether EPA should have independent litigating authority is an enormously complex one. Its answer
cannot depend on what the indirect consequences would be for
criminal prosecutions; that would be the tail wagging the dog.
The second possible reform, which does make sense, is to
require DOJ to present all proposed criminal prosecutions to EPA
for approval or, at the very least for comment. The overall impact
of this change would be slight - most criminal prosecutions
begin as EPA referrals anyhow, and EPA will rarely be opposed
to the prosecution of those that do not have such origins. None-

119. See Starr, supra note 7, at 904.
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theless, the agency would catch the occasional error. For example, in United States v. Self" the court reversed criminal convictions on four RCRA counts on the ground that the natural gas
condensate that had been disposed in violation of RCRA requirements was not in fact a hazardous waste.' This conclusion
turned on a careful reading of lengthy EPA discussions in the
preambles to several different rulemakings' 22 Because in this
area the legal prohibition often turns on consideration of, and
familiarity with, the details not just of a particular statute but of
EPA regulations, EPA input into the appropriateness or validity
of a criminal prosecution should always be obtained.'23
IV. CONCLUSION

Despite the increase in criminal environmental prosecutions
over the past decade, there have been remarkably few abuses.
Those concerned about overzealous, blindered prosecutors can
point to only a handful of cases where things got out of hand.
The potential for abuse exists, but it has gone largely unrealized.
Why has this been?
The answer lies in structural protections - those of the criminal law generally and those provided by taking criminal enforcement out of the hands of the usual environmental enforcers. With
one minor modification, requiring DOJ to obtain EPA approval
for criminal prosecution, the current regime is essentially sound.
120. 2 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1993).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1077-82.
123. I thank Neal Cartusciello and Gary Nurkin (EPA Region II) for suggesting
Self as an example of a failed prosecution that could have been avoided if DOJ
was required to obtain EPA approval. I note that they both endorsed the idea.
Richard Lazarus also discusses Self, he offers it as an example of how
obscure environmental law is. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 2437-38. Lazarus
believes that environmental law's obscurity is one of the features that make criminal prosecutions potentially so problematic: "[t]his obscurity stems from the
sheer density of environmental rules and their obscure, often inaccessible source
materials." Id. at 2436. I agree with his observations and add two points. We
generally tend not to rely upon the EPA to interpret the law, thinking ourselves
capable of cutting through environmental law's obscurity. To remedy this problem, the DOJ should be required to rely upon the EPA's interpretation of the law
so as to ensure proper application of the law to a particular case.
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DOJ should be the prosecutor, and Main Justice should oversee
the USAOs. This is not because DOJ should necessarily handle
all environmental litigation. To the contrary, there is room for a
fuller role for EPA attorneys in other settings. It is precisely
because a criminal prosecution is different that the checks and
balances and the consistency provided by multi-party and ultimately centralized decision-making are especially valuable here.

